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Firms often rely on external financing in order to conduct R&D. We ask to what extent
discriminatory behaviour of the funds provider affects the industry evolution. The model
is based on an evolutionary framework by Nelson and Winter. A firm chooses the amount
of its R&D spending in an adaptive fashion where technological improvement is essential
for survival in the competitive market. Firms can finance their activities by using retained
profits or applying for credit. However, they have a clear hierarchy in choosing the source
of funds and saved profits are always used up first. There is endogenous discriminatory
lending as the banking sector provides credit according to firms’ individual features. It
compares profitability and market share across firms when assessing creditworthiness.
The model is able to capture features of innovation and diffusion of technology. Results
show that the availability of credit is crucial for technological change in a non-linear
fashion and that the industry evolves faster if the bank focuses on market share in
assessing creditworthiness.
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1 Introduction
Empirical research shows that R&D spending is affected by constraints in external funding.
The effect is attributed to fluctuations in R&D spending that are accounted for by restrictions
in credit markets or access to equity, for example due to lack of financial institutions (Among
others, Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2003). Another explanation is higher costs of external capital
whose impact is identified in Dutch samples (Mohnen et al., 2008), Italian manufacturing
samples (Mancusi and Vezzuli, 2010), French manufacturing firms (Savignac, 2007), and US
vs. European samples (Ravera and Canet, 2001). Explanations are based on the information
shortage of external financiers compared to the researching firm. This disadvantage leads
credit or equity providers to require a higher risk premium. Furthermore, even if R&D
produces some innovation that can be implemented, this measure does not yield tangible
assets that can serve as collateral for a loan. This also contributes to the risk premium
(Mohnen et al., 2008, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011). This view is supported by evidence
that considers sub samples of firms that are more likely to be constrained, namely small and
medium enterprises and young firms. Because those lack either collateral and/or a proven
history of creditworthiness, their ability to pay back a loan is highly uncertain. This finding is
consistent with an analysis of Brown et al. (2009) who find that an improved supply of equity
can trigger an R&D boom because relatively young firms benefit from that. Consequently,
a lack of that supply also can lead to a bust in R&D activity as the R&D cycle in the U.S.
in the 1990s showed (Brown et al., 2009, p. 152).
Moreover, firms that have a high R&D intensity suffer comparatively more from constraints
because they usually require relatively higher external funding (Piga and Atzeni, 2007).
Therefore, firms that show inherently one or more of the adverse features suffer discrimination
in access to credit (Canepa and Stoneman, 2008, Hao and Jaffe, 1993, Giudici and Pateari,
2000). The particular role of uncertainty of creditworthiness is pointed out for the case of
Finland (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2003). In this case public subsidies can have a positive
effect because they not only allow a research project to take place but also increase the trust
in creditworthiness by others and thus may enable external financing in the future (Takalo
and Tanayama, 2010).
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the described effects in a world where
the acting entities react to each other. That is, we ask how much the industry, the R&D
undertaken, and the innovation success change if credit restrictions change. More precisely,
the impact of changes in behaviour is accounted for to understand why credit shortages have
the observed impact. For instance, there might be little demand for credit in general and in
this case shortages do not matter. Or there can be a mismatch between those entities that
demand credit and those that would have access. This imbalance then determines how an
increased supply of credit affects the individual R&D efforts.
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The model is embedded in a dynamic agent based framework building on the work of Nelson
and Winter (1982) and Winter (1984) which is set in an evolutionary environment under
Schumpeterian competition. In each period the bank uses information about the firms in
order to determine how much credit it would be willing to lend to each of them. The bank
applies a particular routine of assessing creditworthiness based on multiple features. At the
same time, each firm produces and conducts R&D to some extent. The outcome is some
quantity of a homogenous good which jointly with all other firms determines the market
price and automatically the profit of each firm on the one hand. On the other hand the
R&D effort might lead to the finding of a better technology which the successful firm can
use in the production process of the next period. This leads the successful firm to aiming at
more investment for the next round of production. However, this possibility depends on the
current profit and available credit. If the firm can exploit that technological improvement it
will have better access to credit in the next period. There are two feedback effects at play
in the model: a better technology improves access to credit and access to credit improves
the probability of finding a better technology. Both effects are however, subject to individual
behaviour of both, the bank and the firms. Thus, the effectiveness of the feedback varies in
the behavioural routine of the agents.
Results show that an increase of credit supply translates non-linearly to changes in output
and industry concentration. First, more credit always is contributing to more innovation,
faster growing output and a faster concentrating economy. Nevertheless, if there is either
too tight credit or plenty of credit, increasing credit supply has only a marginal effect. There
is a threshold of credit supply below which the industry evolves more slowly and above which
it evolves with a much higher pace. Secondly, a higher interest rate cuts into profits and
thus economic development. Thirdly, the bank determines credit supply by comparing firms
by profitability and by market share the industry grows faster when the focus is on market
share. The reason is that firms’ innovation success is more directly observable in market
share while the increase in profitability depends on its access to credit. Therefore, innovative
success is more persistent if the bank offers credit mainly on the market share. Last, firms
can influence their R&D success by adapting their effort only if there is much credit available.
This paper strengthens the role of information shortages of lenders as explanation for R&D
spending patterns. The banking sector bases its decision on two observable firm features but
does not have any information about the technology that will be applied in the upcoming
production period. It does a retrospective evaluation but no forward-looking one. Therefore,
it can happen that even the most innovative firms face credit shortages.
This paper contributes to empirical literature that points out that firms with particular
features are more constraint in access to external funding. It provides theoretical explanations
for those features rooted in the behaviour of the lender.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview about the
2
relationship between credit constraints and R&D funding. Section 3 introduces the model
and the experiments. It also discusses results while section 4 makes conclusive remarks.
2 Credit Constraints and R&D Effort
According to the empirical literature, constraints in external funding affect R&D efforts of
firms (Brown et al., 2009, Mohnen et al., 2008). Hall and Lerner (2009) give an overview
of the way R&D and innovation are funded. Small and new innovative firms experience high
costs of capital, the evidence for large firms is mixed. Large firms prefer internal funding and
manage their cash-flow accordingly. There is evidence that firms are constrained in financing
R&D for several reasons. Concerning credit a major aspect is the insecure outcome of R&D
in conjunction with relatively high monitoring costs. Therefore, firms might not be able to be
granted credit to the amount they would like to (Freel, 2007, p. 25). For a United Kingdom
data-based empirical study, Freel (2007) finds that small firms that are innovative actually
experience less credit granting success than their less innovative competitors. Supportive
findings for high-tech firms are provided by Guiso (1998) who uses Italian samples. Cross-
sectional data shows that manufacturers in high-tech categories have a higher probability of
being constrained in credit. The predominant reason might be that there is higher uncertainty
related to producing at the edge of technology.
2.1 Assessing Creditworthiness
The process of granting credit involves the assessment of many pieces of information. The
creditor needs to know how likely it is that his loan is paid back. This evaluation usually
takes the form of a credit rating which includes not only hard numbers but also more soft
information about the debtor, first of all his relation to the creditor and their commercial
history. Banks use ratings that are to some extent standardized. The customer adviser
rates each of the categories according to some guidelines, but under her own discretion. For
instance, the German credit unions (Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken) used the – in the meanwhile
replaced – concept: management, market and sector, customer relation, economic situation
of the customer, forecasted corporate development. All these factors receive a weight between
1/6 and 1/4. Then, summing up the assigned marks, the bank yields the rating (Reichling
et al., 2007, pp. 46-49). The instrument of rating is mandatory because it is required by the
Basel II agreement which requires banks to hold equity according to the risk of credits they
granted (Reichling et al., 2007, p. 39). Although the probability of default is the crucial
figure to estimate, banks do rely mostly on heuristic methods to assess that probability,
even if there are also statistical and causal analytical methods, like models of option pricing.
One reason is that statistical methods are only meaningful if the data set is sufficiently
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large (Reichling et al., 2007, p. 55). This particular example of a rating model shows that
the current economic situation of the customer plays the most crucial role, along with the
customer history. The assessment of the future counts only as much as the management or
the commercial sector does. Nevertheless, “[a]n assessment that only includes the present
must not be decisive - the [firm’s] focus on the orientation to the future must be satisfactory.”
(Kremer and ten Hoevel, 1989, p. 122.)
2.2 Adaptive R&D Strategies
There is also some indication that R&D policy reacts to credit constraints. Aghion et al.
(2012) find that credit rationing influences the R&D policy of French firms where the effect
depends on the degree to which firms are financed externally. Constrained firms in the sample
adjust R&D efforts in a more procyclical way. In a theoretical approach, Aghion et al. (2010)
establish credit constraints as source of turning long-term investment pro-cyclical because of
the liquidity risk involved in external finance when constraints become effective. Constraints
have less the impact that projects are not carried out to the full extent but rather that they
are not started at all in a sample of Italian small and medium size enterprises (Mancusi and
Vezzuli, 2010). Furthermore, firms try to mitigate their dependence on outside funding by
building up cash reserves which allows them to smoothen R&D activity over time. This
behaviour is encouraged by high adjustment costs because R&D costs consist mainly of high
wages for specialised researchers (Brown et al., 2012). In a theoretical approach, Yildizoglu
(2002) finds that adaptive strategies due to learning outperform static rules for investment.
Other insights about firms’ R&D strategies are:
• Ben-Zion (1984): Investment in R&D is riskier than investment in production (expan-
sion) since there is more uncertainty about the outcome of research. Therefore, since
in good times investment in R&D is easier to justify, research investment increases in
economically favourable times.
• Yildizoglu (2002): Investment is not static. Learning makes a huge difference. Firms
using adaptive research strategies perform better. Also, the higher the share of learning
firms in an economy the further upward technology is pushed and so is output. Fur-
thermore, firms who do not experience success of R&D after a while tend to abandon
research activities. Also high competition among firms leads to lower R&D.
• Lee and Harrison (2001): Depending on outside firm conditions it is possible to see
firms using both, innovative and imitative strategies at the same time or that almost
all firms (i.e. the vast majority) tend to either strategy. The important factors for this
are the probabilities of payoffs, the distribution of payoff amounts and lag times for
payoffs of an investment that had been made.
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• Yildizoglu (2001): When discussing the particular way in which firms learn, not only
adaptation is important, but also expectations. Expectations are usually overlooked in
modeling learning processes.
Also, R&D investment is a special case because more than 50% of spending is due to high
wages for knowledge workers. Therefore, “[f]irms tend to smoothen R&D investment over
time in order to avoid having to lay off knowledge workers.” (Hall and Lerner, 2009, p.5.)
Furthermore, Ben-Zion (1984) mentions the relation between (stock and bond) market value
(and investor strategies) and the R&D decisions of firms.
3 The Model
The model is about the evolution of an industrial sector where firms compete in improving
their technology used in the production process of a homogenous good. Demand is given and
joint output determines the market price and implicitly each firm’s profit. In order to improve
their technology, firms rely on their retained profits and possibly on external sources of funds
for financing their R&D effort. In some situations there might be shortages in available
funding. This model tackles the question which role the assessment of creditworthiness plays
in the evolution of the sector when there are feedback mechanisms. Furthermore, the impact
of the firm strategy of how to conduct R&D on the industrial output is examined. The
time-line of events is as follows:
1. The bank has some amount of credit available for lending. According to the firms’
features at the beginning of the period, it decides how much credit to grant each firm.
2. Firms have a size equal to their stock of physical capital Kit . They produce output and
simultaneously draw for better technology. Joint output determines the market price
Pt . And the draw determines the available technology in the next period.
3. Firms observe their current profits and the success of their past R&D effort. Then, each
firm decides about physical investment and R&D spending. If desired total spending
exceeds internal funds available, the firm applies for a credit.
4. The credit offered and credit demanded determine the funds available for a firm to
invest in physical capital and to additionally perform R&D. The impact of investment
and R&D is effective in the next period.
This is a model where the firms do not possess exclusive rights for their technology, like a
patent. The effect of this legal framework may indeed be that competition might lead to
less R&D, at least for innovative activities, since the incentives for cost reduction are lower
(Gilbert, 2006, p 173). It has to be pointed out that innovation can take many forms, like
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product or process innovation where in this framework, only process innovation is replicated.
The general difference is that product innovation is even less certain than process innovation,
partly due to the more incremental character of process innovation1 While innovation can
also be distinguished by its effect of reducing production costs or increasing the output per
unit of input, the following framework assumes that output increases, which is in line with
Schumpeter’s definition of innovation: “we ... define innovation as the setting up of a new
production function.”(Schumpeter, 1939, p. 83.)
3.1 Setup
Output Q is generated by technology A and capital K by each firm at each period:
Qit = AitKit . (1)
Total output is equivalent to fixed demand so that the market price P follows an inverse
demand function
Qt =∑Qit =∑AitKit ≡ D (2)
Pt =
D
Qt
. (3)
In case of drawing an imitation the firm adopts the industry’s best technology. If drawing
an innovation, it gets a sample from a distribution of technical opportunities distributed
according to
F(A˜it ;Ait) (4)
while A˜it ∼ LogNormal(Ait ,1). This implies that any innovation that is found is actually
better than the currently employed technology. Successful draws are indicated by
χ im,init =
1, if there is a successful draw of imitation (im) or innovation (in),0, else.
1See Schumpeter (1939, 1942) for a detailed discussion of the degree to which new techniques trigger readjustments
of or even setting up capital and processes.
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For a firm the productivity level of following periods is given by
Ai(t+1) =Max(Ait ,χ imit Aˆt ,χ
in
it A˜it) (5)
Here Aˆt is the highest (best practice) productivity level in the industry in period t, and A˜it
is a random variable that is the result of the innovation draw. A firm’s desired expansion or
contraction is determined by the ratio of price to production cost P·Ac or, equivalently, the
percentage margin over cost, and its market share. A firm’s ability to finance its investment is
constrained by its profitability, which is affected by its R&D outlays as well as by revenues and
production costs. Capital is subject to depreciation at rate δ and investment I. Profitability
pi is determined by the productivity cost difference per unit of capital and the spending on
last periods loan, which is determined by the interest rate i and the loan taken l in the last
period by the firm:
Ki(t+1) = I
(
PtAi(t+1)
c
,
Qit
Qt
,piit ,δ
)
Kit +(1−δ )Kit (6)
piit = PtAit − c− it−1lit−1 (7)
Γit = PtAit − c (8)
where Γit represents a firm’s gross profit and piit denotes net profit after interest paid. The
probabilities of drawing better technologies are due to imitation and innovation respectively
and depend positively on the firm size, i.e. the amount of capital, some positive factor
aim,ain, and the usage of R&D spendings Φ
Prob(dimt = 1) = 1− e−aimKitΦitκit
Prob(din = 1) = 1− e−ainKitΦit (1−κit ) (9)
where κit is the share which allocates funds to imitation.2 Assume that a firm does either
imitation search or innovation search only. Let this depend on whether it actually employs
the best technology already or whether it uses less efficient technology. The rationale is
that a technology leader has nothing to copy from and can thus devote all financial means
of research to innovative search.3 Firms with less efficient technology would then strictly
search any possibility to copy existing technology. This is a drastic statement but also very
simple. A precondition for this action is that there is common knowledge about the highest
2These probabilities are inspired by Dosi et al. (2011).
3The particular role both, innovation and imitation play in economic growth is subject to a lot of discussion and
research. While innovation breaks ground to better techniques, the diffusion of this techniques as firms reorganize
usually leads to the real push in economic activity. See for example, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) for some
discussion.
7
technology.4 Therefore,
κit =
0, for Aˆt = Ait1, else. (10)
Credit would be demanded (only) if investment cannot be financed otherwise, that is by
using net profit piit and savings from the end of the prior period Sit−1/Kit . A firm desires
physical investment (capital) according to the function
Idit = 1+ δ −
µit
PtAi(t+1)
c
(11)
µit =
ϕ− (ϕ−1)sit
ϕ−ϕsit . (12)
where µit is the markup power a firm could exert. This markup consists of some parameter
ϕ and the current market share of a firm sit . The higher the market share, the higher is
the markup (Winter, 1984, p. 319). The investment desire then depends negatively on
the markup and positively on the price-over-cost margin of the firm. That is, the higher the
market share, the less investment in physical capital is desired and the higher the profitability,
the higher the desired investment since the profitability directly depends on the price-over-cost
margin. Together with R&D demand Φdit the firm has demand for expenditures Edit =Φdit+ Idit .
Denote Cit = piit + Sit−1/Kit − lit−1 as liquidity per unit of capital. It consists of net profits,
accumulated savings and recent credit to be paid back. By assuming a strict hierarchy in
financing, a firm would first use profit to finance investment and then refer to its savings.
If investment desire exceeds liquidity, i.e. net profit minus old debt obligations plus savings,
there is demand for additional cash in the form of credit. Credit demand is the difference
needed for financing
ldit =
Edit −Cit for Cit < Edit0 else. (13)
The bank might offer credit based on a set of firm features. There is supply for credit ls
per unit of capital in the economy. It is assumed to be constant which leads to supply in
absolute terms of lst = ls ·∑iKit . The bank supplies credit to each individual firm in units of
4Other models employ a more sophisticated and incremental choice between imitation and innovation effort which
then does not require common knowledge. See, for instance, Colombo et al. (2012).
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capital based on profitability and market share.
lsit =

lst
Kit
(
λ piit−1∑pi post−1 +(1−λ )
Qit−1
∑ (Qit−1)
)
for piit−1 > 0
lst
Kit
(1−λ ) Qit−1∑ (Qit−1) else,
(14)
where 0≤ λ ≤ 1 and ∑pi post−1 is the sum of all profits from firms that yielded positive profits.
The first part of the term refers to the average credit supply per unit of capital and the second
one determines an increase or decrease for an individual firm according to its profitability and
market share. This concept hence avoids some potential problems for the case that -due to
negative profits- some firms’ profits are huge relative to the average profit. Thus, the bank
takes into account relative profitability and relative technology level. This also means that
the available amount of credit, lst , is not used to 100% in most cases as firms with negative
profit are only offered a share computed by (1−λ ) times the market share. Assuming that
the credit supply per unit of capital is fixed, the absolute amount of credit offered will grow
in the total amount of capital in the industry. Starting with a fixed supply of credit, the
credit is allocated among the firms applying for it. Then,
lit =Min
[
ldit , l
s
it
]
(15)
This means that even if profits are negative and there is no liquidity, R&D can be conducted
up to the amount of credit. The investment constraint is
Icit =Cit + lit . (16)
Actual physical investment is then determined by this constraint and the desired investment.
Actual R&D investment is furthermore determined by the amount of liquidity not used for
physical investment and the R&D desire
Iit =Min[Icit , I
d
it ] (17)
Φit =Min[Icit − Iit ,Φdit ]. (18)
The firms save money not invested. Savings evolve according to (Colombo et al., 2012, pp.
88, 89)
Sit = Sit−1+(piit + lit − Iit −Φit)Kit . (19)
Note that savings are noted in absolute numbers and cannot be negative. Firms determine
their R&D effort according to prior success of research and in boom times the firms tend to
increase R&D. Denoting Φit the per unit of capital R&D spending of a firm i at t, the firm
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changes R&D spending according to the factor Ω. Desired spending on R&D is
Φdit =Max
[
Φit−1(1+Ωit),bRD
]
(20)
with
Ωit = λF(piit−1−piit−T−1) (21)
where T is the number of periods that the firm is looking back and Ω increases in the evolu-
tion of profits, the R&D success history, and market share as that is directly incorporated in
profitability. Furthermore, bRD is some basic R&D activity always desired to be undertaken.
This behavioural rule is intended to capture increases in R&D if times are good (Ben-Zion,
1984). and the abandoning of R&D if it lacks success or if competition is too tight which
reduces profitability (Yildizoglu, 2002). Note that there will be always a non-zero level of
desired R&D which does not completely match with the statement of Yildizoglu (2002) that
firms without R&D success will abandon research completely. Note also that, compared to
the Nelson-Winter approach it is just profit and savings that determine investment possi-
bilities. In the Nelson-Winter approach the constraint includes depreciation. However, it is
not clear where the funds may come from. Therefore, the pure constraint seems reasonable
from that perspective. Note also that possible R&D spending is already accounted for in the
(net) profit.
Entry takes place according to a two-stage process. First, there is exogenous activity and
thus the number of potential imitators and innovators is determined. Then, those draw a
random technology. A constant for innovation N = 0.05 and imitation M = 0.05 determines
the number of potential entrants for innovation and imitative behavior. After drawing an
individual technology, entry takes place if the potential entrant has drawn at least the cur-
rently average technology. The other features of the entrants like capital are then further
determined randomly under a uniformly distributed probability within the range of existing
firms’ features. A special case applies to the R&D policy since a new firm does not have a
history yet. Assume that entrants also apply the strategy Φini as well.
3.2 Main Driver of the Model
The driving force of the model is the difference in technology which determines the relative
profitability. According to an adjustment in firm sizes and therefore output, firms face market
pressure due a decrease in price as a result of the change in output.
• R&D fosters the productivity level Ait for firm i at time t.
• Ait improves the price-over-cost margin for the next period.
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• A better anticipated p-o-c margin spurs the desired expansion.
• In the following period, the firm will increase output ceteris paribus. This contributes
to overall output and drives down the market price. The firm with better technol-
ogy benefits because the technological advantage always outweighs the price decrease
for non-monopolists. Other firms suffer from the lower price under given individual
technology.
• The firm with improved technology gains market share and higher profits.
• According to credit supply rules, the improved technology firm is offered more credit.
Hence it can grow. Other firms are offered less credit and have also less desire to invest
and shrink. Both, the credit constraint and the lower amount of capital decrease the
firm’s probability of finding a technological improvement.
• The longer there is a gap in technology, the more concentrated the industry will be-
come.
Those events are subject to enough financial means. Due to the hierarchy, R&D is only
possible after all physical investment that is desired is satisfied. Therefore, if there are any
funding shortages, R&D is impossible. This is in line with findings that R&D reacts the
most sensitive of all investment to funding shortages (Mohnen et al., 2008). If there is
enough funding available, either due to retained profits or credit, a given change in a firm’s
technology triggers more pressure on the competitors if this is a very big firm. Since output
increases relatively more in this case the price is driven down significantly. There are two
channels at work in the dynamics of the model: firm size via investment and technology via
R&D. Both determine a single firms’ output and thus the overall price level in the industry
(indirect feedback).
3.2.1 Converging and Diverging Forces
The main mechanism in the Nelson-Winter model would lead to a steady state market which
means that the behavioural rule of investment desire has a converging effect. This is due to
the influence of the market share: the higher the market share, the less investment is de-
sired. Furthermore, a better technology always increases investment desire because it always
improves the price-over-cost margin, except in the monopoly case where it has no effect.
Given the linear price structure, for a firm in a non-monopoly market, increasing technology
always increases profitability.
∂piit
∂Ait
=M
(
∑Q−it +KitAit
)−1
+MAit
(
∑Q−it +KitAit
)−2 · (−1)Kit > 0
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⇔ (∑Q−it +KitAit)= Qt > AitKit = Qit
since (∑Q−it +KitAit)−2 is positive withM as market size. In case of a monopoly, Qt = Qit
and ∂piit∂Ait = 0.
Also, in a non-monopoly situation, higher technology always increases the market share of
a firm. This can already intuitively seen as the change in output due to higher technology
always is bigger relative to the change in aggregate output. Thus, for the market share
calculation AitKit∑AitKit , the numerator increases to a larger extent than the denominator and the
entire term will thus increase. In the monopoly case the change is zero.
The finding of a better technology has a positive effect for the successful firm. Nevertheless,
the availability of credit determines how severe the positive impact will be. This is an
important feature of this model and in line with the findings of Lee and Harrison (2001) who
claim that the benefits from R&D and even innovation often are effective after some time
lag and which then influence further R&D behaviour (Lee and Harrison, 2001). A better
technology found in period t leads to immediately increased desired investment in t. Then,
this leads to a higher level of capital in t + 1. Both, better technology and more capital
boost output of the finding firm in t+1 with an increased market share. Because also total
output will increase, the market price decreases. Then, the availability of credit determines
how much the market share and profitability change until t+ 1. Furthermore, market share
and profitability in t + 1 determine the further availability of credit from period t + 2 on.
If there is enough credit available in t the increase in output will be large because desired
investment is completely satisfied. At the same time, the profitability following in t+1 will be
comparatively low due to the price mechanism. If there is a credit shortage and investment
cannot be done to the full extent desired, the impact on output will be lower; but because
the price decrease is not as severe the increase in profitability is more pronounced. Therefore,
the availability of credit in t+ 2 is influenced by the availability of credit in t. In t+ 2 then,
the bank policy (λ ) matters because it is crucial whether the emphasis is on market share
or profitability.
Thus, financing constraints at the time of a successful innovation/ imitation can hinder the
economic success of R&D and henceforth set back further increases in the R&D effort.
3.2.2 Small Firms vs Large Firms
Small firms react less on improvements of technology in absolute terms because their markup
(µit) is smaller. Their desired investment changes less if the market share is low. Furthermore,
since investment is in terms of per unit of capital, the absolute change for any given rate of
desired investment is lower for small firms. Therefore, due to their low level of capital, even
a large investment per unit of capital is only of limited effect on output and price. However,
via this price mechanism the profitability of small firms improves more significantly compared
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to large firms. This has a direct effect on the following R&D desire of the small firm.
Therefore, smaller firms tend to improve their profitability rather than their size compared
to large firms as a direct result of a successful innovation/ imitation.
4 Simulation Results
The common features of the experiments are given by the parameter setup
Dt 1000 δ 0.03 bRD 0.002 Φ0it 0.004 ainit 0.007
c 0.16 ϕ 3 K0it 140 aimit 0.02
where there are 100 runs for each value of a varied parameter. The initial number of firms
is 10, the interest rate is 2% , the bank policy λ = 0.5 and firms’ policy λF = 2. The results
are taken from an average between the periods t = 280 to t = 300. For the experiments, the
credit supply is chosen according to a critical level of credit supply that might just cover credit
demand. In order to find an appropriate level, credit surplus for the above setting is looked
at for a range of credit supply. Figure 1 shows the lowest level of credit supply that yields
Figure 1: Lowest level of credit supply that generates positive excess credit supply.
positive excess credit supply for 100 simulations where for each repetition ls ∈ [0.02,0.05].
The mean is 0.030404 with a standard deviation of 0.00422135. Results range from 0.02 to
0.0374. For the experiments concerning market conditions, credit supply is fixed to ls = 0.03
which is credit supply per unit of total capital in the industry. For the policy experiments
this level is refined a little bit more to ls = 0.027.
In a situation without any external financing opportunity, technology does not improve at
all since the firms earn just the depreciation rate and can only replace written off capital.
If entry does take place, competition increases and firms earn even less than depreciation.
There is no improvement at all but the firms decrease in size over time as the market is
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fixed. In either situation there is no funding for R&D available.5 In this section the effects
of credit supply and the interest rate are examined first. It will be interesting to look at the
concentration of output, that is monopoly power which is measured by the Herfindahl Index.
Also, the evolution of overall industry output gives insight on the effects under investigation.
For comparison, we will manipulate parameters of importance and check whether long run
results differ according to that changes. First, the effect of credit supply and the interest
rate are examined, then the firms’ and banks’ behaviour is subject to examination.
4.1 Market Conditions
The market conditions that govern the outcome are credit supply, interest rates and demand.
Demand determines the severeness of competition in an industry but is not really a constraint
like credit supply or the interest rate. We focus on the latter two. Constraints of financing
can originate in
• no source of financing,
• a slow setting up of financing or
• a too high interest rate (Savignac, 2007, p. 6).
For a French sample, from all restraint firms, as much as 88% had no financing source for
their project, and 22% faced a too high interest rate to conduct a successful implementa-
tion of their project (Savignac, 2007, p.7). Schumpeter (1939, 1941) points out that in a
competitive environment, probably no firm does yield enough profit as to perform R&D. It
is only the monopolist who can set aside enough money and thus take research action. In
this model, a monopolist or the sole user of state-of-the-art technology can exert pressure
via the productivity of her capital. Her productivity increase will exceed costs more the
higher his technology out-stands his competitors’ one. Increased production lowers the price
and therefore the technological monopolist has a comparative advantage which yields above
average profits.
4.1.1 Credit Supply
The expected impact of credit supply is that the more credit is available, the easier is financing
investment and the better the industry can evolve.
A representative run for a time span of 1000 period shows that if there is no credit whatsoever,
neither innovation nor imitation takes place (figure 2b). This is due to the fact that the
5It is debatable whether firms with credit shortages will do no R&D whatsoever for all times. It might occur that
they shift to an R&D priority after a while in order to improve somehow, even if the company must shrink severely
initially.
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competitive market does not allow for abnormal profitability in a situation where every firm
is the same in the first place.
(a) Number of firms (b) Best technology (c) Industry output
(d) Average R&D spending (e) savings (total) (f) unsatisfied credit demand
Figure 2: Representative over time evolution with no credit available.
Firms need all their profits to reinvest into physical capital in order to counter depreciation.
Thus, there is no R&D conducted whatsoever (figure 2d) and consequently no technological
improvement (figure 2b). Entering firms with the same technology then add more pressure
to the price by their output and firms can only downsize. However, the price pressure is
not large enough to drive many firms out of the market (figure 2a). There is a steady state
situation where the firms have just the size that joint output yields a price that ensures a
price-over-cost margin of the amount of depreciation (figures 2c and 2e). The increasing
number of firms and the low profitability increases the need of credit (figure 2f). If no firm
would enter, technology would be fixed as would be firm sizes, output, and price.
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(a) Number of firms (b) Best technology (c) Industry output
(d) Average R&D spending (e) savings w/o biggest saver (f) unsatisfied credit demand
Figure 3: Representative over time evolution with credit available ls = 0.3.
A representative run for a high level of credit supply (ls = 0.3) reveals that innovation
takes place more often and the phases of diffusion where concentration slowly decreases are
interrupted many times. Technology is improved (figure 3b) which boosts output (figure 3c).
This is possible because there is actually some spending on R&D (figure 3d). Some firms
are profitable and can retain profits (figure 3e). Then, there is less credit demand unsatisfied
(figure 3f). Competition and price pressure drive many firms out of the market (figure 3a).
If less credit is available at the time of a successful draw t, then the increased desire for
investment might not be met fully and neither does the firm grow too much nor does it
conduct any R&D in the following period. Hence, the impact on market share is humble but
the change in profitability is rather high. Consequently, R&D desire in t+1 will be high but
investment desire might be comparatively low because of the increased market share and the
higher price-over-cost-margin. Credit supply, at this point is still not influenced fully because
it looks back one period and will thus only be effective in response to profitability in t+ 2.
16
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: Impact of credit supply
The experiment of the impact of credit supply levels is done for incremental values of credit
supply for ls ∈ [0.02,0.045]. Results are shown in figure 4. The effect of higher credit supply
is nonlinear and distinct. As more credit is available, the level of technology is increasing
faster and the overall output is higher (figure 4a). There is an emergence of fewer but larger
firms (figure 4b) as a result of productivity improvements. Larger firms also absorb more of
the credit supplied in total which also hurts laggard firms’ ability to spend funds on R&D.
The negative credit surplus in the same figure (figure 4c) indicates that firms very well would
invest more but are effectively constrained. As they only outbalance their depreciation, no
firm grows and as new firms keep entering the economy, competition becomes tougher and
brings down prices and hence profit. Therefore, firms find it harder over time to outbalance
depreciation and the result is that firms shrink and concentration decreases (figure 4b). If
firms can access the funding they desire, which is indicated by more and more credit surplus
(figure 4c), R&D can effectively be conducted and there are technological improvements
(figures 4d and 4e). Figure 5 confirms that credit supply results in a lower relative number
of firms that are actually constrained in credit. This is partly due to some firms accumulating
savings and thus not demanding credit and partly due to a shake out period leaving only the
more successful firms.
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(a) Ls = 0 (b) Ls = 0.027
Figure 5: Share of firms that face constraints in financing over time
This creates firms that have a better price-over-cost margin than other firms and those
firms hence yield more profit and grow. They also gain market share. This puts further
pressure on firms with inferior technology as the price is pushed down. Hence, more firms
leave the economy (figure 4f).
Specifically, the impact of credit supply is non-linear. Abundant credit supply allows the
economy to evolve much different, i.e. there is a jump in the dependent value. Without
credit supply firms have demand for R&D but cannot do it because their investment in
capital does not leave any funds for additional investment in R&D. With the strict hierarchy
in place that physical investment comes first, there is almost never any funding of R&D and
thus technology does not improve (see figure 2b).
4.1.2 Interest Rate
The next experiments are conducted using incremental levels of interest for i∈ [0,0.2]. Figure
6 depicts the impact of the credit interest rate on economic performance. The intuitive effect
of the rate is that the higher the interest rate is, the less profitable are firms. As credit supply
is given but varying for firms, lower profits mean a more effective constraint in financing on
average. Furthermore, a high interest rate leaves firms spending more and more on the credit
and less funds are left for conducting R&D and investment. Thus, output and the frequency
of technological improvements should be lower as the demand for credit is met to a lesser
extent.
The experiment shows that output actually is lower in the interest rate (figure 6a). As
profits are lower, the firms demand credit in order to finance their endeavors. Therefore,
due to financial constraints, credit surplus is decreasing in the interest rate (figure 6c). The
image about the Herfindahl index (figure 6b) delivers evidence for firms being more equal
in higher interest rates. The costlier credit is, the less imitation and innovation actually is
observed (figures 6d and 6e). Therefore, less innovation and imitation takes place economy-
wide. Nevertheless, less innovation and imitation leaves the firms to be more equal. No firm
is able to exert enough pressure to drive competitors out of the industry, which is visible in
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 6: Impact of the interest rate
the lower exit rates in the interest rate (figure 6f).
4.2 Policies
There are two ways in which the behaviour of the agents can influence the dynamics: the
bank’s weighing of firm features in offering credit and the intensity of change of the firms’
R&D adaptation rule. It affects the determinant of adaptation Ω. The bank’s policy is the
main matter of interest. It determines the financial constraint any individual firm is facing.
Although the overall credit supply does influence the individual access to credit, it is the
bank’s policy that accounts for the differences among credit supply for individual firms. The
key question addressed is to what extent the bank’s policy promotes a particular outcome,
that is, whether it has only a small influence or whether it can change the dynamics of the
industry rather completely. While the empirical evidence mentioned in section 2.2 indicates
that firms are behaving pro-cyclical in setting their R&D rule, it is possible to see which effect
a counter-cyclical behaviour can have. Furthermore, it is possible to account for the impact
that the intensity of their behaviour can have. Empirical evidence also points at rather static
rules due to relatively high costs of change in R&D settings. It is hence possible to check
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whether a higher flexibility in adapting to financial conditions would be likely to benefit the
industry as a whole.
4.2.1 Bank’s Policy
The bank assesses creditworthiness according to two pieces of information in this model: col-
lateral and expected cash-flow. Collateral provided by the firm is represented by the market
share and profitability is a proxy for expected cash flow. Market share can represent collateral
if the stock of products would be considered to be pledged. This relies less on the machinery
as collateral but on the final product. The cash flow expectation is represented here in the
simplest possible fashion. Since banks also use heuristic concepts for the assessment of the
firm prospects (Reichling et al., 2007), this is captured by the one-period focus on profitabil-
ity. In reality, several periods of profit would be taken into account. As the bank’s policy
is a mix between evaluating the collateral amount by looking at the market share and fore-
casting cash flow by looking at the profitability, its policy can be described by the weighing
parameter (λ ) that determines the impact of each piece of information on the credit decision.
Theoretically, access to credit promotes output rather than profitability because the firm
translates technology improvements in physical investment first. In case the following output
is significantly higher, the price mechanism dampens the increase in profitability.
The availability of credit at the time of finding a better technology is decisive. If there is
sufficient credit supply at the time a new technology is found, there is a huge impact of the
finding on further credit availability in case the bank puts emphasis on collateral. Since the
access to credit at the time of the finding allows for a significant investment and thus increase
in capital, the firm will grow significantly. Therefore, firm size at t+ 1 is relatively large as
is market share. A crucial feature for the likelihood of drawing a technology improvement is
the firm size (see eq. (9)). Also, the firm size is the crucial feature for market share. The
bank hence promotes mostly firms that are already doing well. Then, in t+ 2 this matters
for the further availability of credit. If the bank focuses on profitability, the following credit
supply is comparatively low because the massive increase in output and market share pulls
the market price down which limits profitability increases in t + 1. As the bank evaluates
profitability, further credit supply in t+ 2 will be comparatively modest.
Comparatively, if there is credit shortage in t, the increase in market share at t+1 is relatively
low which leaves a higher market price in t + 1 and a comparatively lower price-over-cost
margin.
Then, if the bank looks only at collateral, credit supply in t+ 2 is relatively low and if the
bank looks only at profitability, it will offer comparatively more credit in t+ 2.
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(a) output (b) HHI (c) overall credit surplus (d) cumulated innova-
tions
(e) cumulated imitations (f) cumul. exits (g) share of constr. firms (h) av. longevity of firms
(i) Correlation Profit(t)-
Firm Size (t+10)
Figure 7: Impact of bank policy
The experiment results are depicted in figure 7. Output decreases in the weight the bank
puts on profitability (figure 7a). If the bank puts emphasis only on the market share (λ = 0)
there is a high concentration evolving (figure 7b) because there is a higher probability for an
innovating / imitating firm that it actually can do even more research (figures 7d and 7e).
This results in a higher credit surplus as indicated by figure 7c.
The credit shortage for the non-technology-improving firms reinforces the financial disad-
vantage. These firms are driven out of the industry relatively quickly which is indicated by
the low longevity of firms (figure 7h) and the high number of exits for the collateral focused
bank policy (figure 7f).
This is supported by the indicator of the share of firms that is actually constrained in credit.
This share is bigger for the profitability based bank policy (figure 7g). For this profitability
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based policy only technology propels a faster firm growth via the aid of credit supply. For the
collateral based approach both factors contribute to the growth advantage of a technology
improving firm. Therefore, we observe a higher correlation between profits and firm size for
a policy that focuses on firm size, not on profitability (figure 7i).
The experiment supports the prior theoretical explanation and emphasizes the role of bank
behaviour in the evolution of the industry.
4.2.2 Firms’ Policy
Firms decide individually how much they want to spend on R&D. According to empirical
evidence they adjust their R&D effort to their business situation (see section 2.2). In this
model this situation is represented by productivity. If productivity increases, so does the R&D
desire of firms. If there were no constraints in financing R&D there would be an inherent
force that would create a wedge between firms and lead to concentration. Firms who are
successful would even do more R&D and thus expand their lead. The opposite is true for
less successful firms: they even would reduce their R&D activity and therefore would be
even less likely to catch up. With financing restrictions in place this drift is less severe as
firms’ expansion of R&D might be dampened. The tighter credit constraints are, the less
technological improvement will take place in general. Nevertheless, even if firms pursue a
different policy for R&D according to profitability, they all increase physical investment in
profitability. Along with a given technology, this already is a driving force of concentration
because of the price mechanism.
A higher profitability in t+1 after technology improvement in t has an impact on the desired
spending on R&D. If the reaction of the firm is positive, any higher profitability will lead
to a higher desired R&D spending compared to the last period. Nevertheless, if following
R&D desire over two periods after an innovation, a lack of funding might set back actual
R&D spending. An increased profitability always leads to a positive tendency in the R&D
desire, but the desire also depends on the actual spending from the prior period. Therefore,
a funding restriction on investment at t leads to a higher desired change in R&D investment,
but not to a higher level because in t + 1 actual R&D was set back. For a full funding
situation, as profitability is comparatively lower, the desired change in R&D spending is
lower but the actual level is higher. If the firms react negatively on profitability, the effect is
vice versa. We expect that under a regime with credit scarcity the firm behaviour has not
much impact while in a regime with abundant credit available a more drastic reaction should
boost output.
The experiments conducted track differences out of the firms’ adaptation behaviour. Results
under a scarce credit supply regime are shown in figure 8. Results for a regime with abundant
credit supply are shown in figure 9.
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(a) output (b) HHI (c) overall credit surplus (d) cumulated innova-
tions
(e) cumulated imitations (f) share of constr. firms (g) av. longevity of firms
(h) Correlation Profit(t)-
Firm Size (t+10)
Figure 8: Impact of firm rule
The credit scarcity regime depicted in figure 8 shows that there is no distinct impact of
neither the basic strategy of the firms nor the magnitude of reaction. The reason is that once
a credit shortage was effective, R&D desire is set back to the basic level. Then, it does not
matter too much whether the change in desire (Ω) might be high or low. The comparative
(a) best technology (b) output (c) HHI (d) overall profit
Figure 9: Effect of firm rule with abundant credit supply
experiment with an abundance of credit available reveals that the firm policy would have
an impact if there was sufficient credit (figure 9). Then, the severeness of reaction (λF)
would positively influence technology (figure 9a) and output (figure 9b). Concentration
and total profits would depend on the direction of the policy (figures 9c and 9d), that is
whether the firm increases desired R&D spending in economically favourable times (λF > 0)
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or whether is has a contrariwise policy (λF < 0). If a contrariwise firm policy is in place,
technological leaders will cut spending on R&D while laggard firms will try to catch up. If
credit supply is abundant they can actually spend money on R&D and so imitation is possible.
As technology more and more diffuses by imitation, the leading firms suffer in profitability
and again increase their R&D spending desire. Overall output is higher if the reaction is
stronger, but concentration is lower because the laggard firms do not suffer from funding
shortages and diffusion is more pronounced. Since there is more equality among firms and
less advantages for single firms, more firms stay in the industry but earn less. If credit supply
is large enough, the less profit does not hinder R&D effort as Ponzi-financing can emerge.
Nevertheless, if credit supply is large enough, this situation can be sustained for a long time.
For a positive reaction on profitability, leading firms try to take off even further. Due to
sufficient external funding they can do so and have a high probability of drawing better
technology also in the long run. Other firms cut desired spending on R&D and diffusion is
less likely. Many firms leave the industry and the concentration is higher. Overall profits and
output are higher because the technological frontier is shifted significantly, but this is due to
only a few (or even only one) firms.
The comparison of firm behaviour in the two credit regimes supports the prior theoretical
approach. There are three factors that explain the different results for the two regimes.
First, scarcity of credit does not allow for R&D conducted on top of investment. Therefore,
the firm behaviour does not matter much. Second, the intensity of reaction does matter. A
higher intensity leads to higher output because firms want to push R&D effort more distinctly.
Third, concentration is stronger the more positive firms react on their profit history. The
reason is that profits positively affect investment which is also crucial for competition and
growth.
4.3 Joint Effects
The previous experiments showed the single effects of market and policy characterizations
in a particular environment. These observations can be combined to a larger picture of the
effects in particular circumstances. In order to check the robustness of those observations,
a Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank test is used. This non-parametric test is done for the impact of
the bank policy under 100 random market and firm policy setups for a significance level of
95%. As market conditions cannot be influenced by the agents in this model, the focus is
on policies. Furthermore, since the impact of credit constraints is the matter of interest, the
results obtained are checked for robustness by focusing on the bank policy and comparing
three levels of it. It is checked whether the results obtained from the comparative analysis
hold in broader, randomly chosen parameter setups, that is, in a broader environment. The
Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test confirms the qualitative findings so that those are concluded to
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be robust at a 95% significance level (see appendix).
As the model is intended to capture the effects of credit shortage, the level of credit supply
turns out to be the most influential part of the model. If there is a shortage, no R&D
is conducted because investment in replacement and additional machinery has priority. If
there is abundance of credit, firms can conduct a lot of R&D which pushes the technological
frontier forward. The way credit supply is allocated is hence crucial only if credit is scarce.
Then, credit is offered to a fraction of the firms while other firms are almost excluded
from credit. This is the environment where behaviour has the highest impact. The bank
determines which features are important for access to credit. If it puts most weight on
market share, the firm policy does not have a significant effect because the firm R&D policy
only responds to profitability. Its response to market share is fixed in the investment desire
function. However, as soon as the bank puts some weight on profitability, the firm policy
gains importance. In this case both, the bank and the firm react positively to profitability,
thus, there is a twofold positive feedback on profitability. In a situation of scarce credit supply
and credit allocation based (also) on profitability it pays off for a firm to adjust R&D desire
according to profitability because the bank also reacts positively on it. It can be observed
that the firm policy is more effective if credit supply is high with respect to output and
concentration (see figure 9), however, this impact does not change very much due to bank
policy as long as there is some weight put on profitability by the bank (- see Wilcoxon-Test
results in the appendix). If there is plenty of credit available, firms can finance almost every
investment and R&D desire and the distinction by the bank still leaves enough credit supply
for the least supplied firm. Additionally, firms only demand a limited amount of credit, even
in periods of high intended investment and R&D. Therefore, the bank policy does not have
a significant impact in such a situation. The same is true if credit supply is too low. Then,
even the best firm is not being offered enough credit to conduct R&D on top of investment.
Thus, there is a minimum level of credit supply that is necessary to enable firms to develop
over time below which, neither the bank policy nor the firm policy is of much impact. Once
this level is passed, the bank policy becomes crucial. It exerts the most effect if credit
supply is not large enough to allow for Ponzi-financing. Nevertheless, the firm policy is most
effective in a situation of Ponzi-financing because then it is assured that it actually will be
able to carry out its policy.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this work was to examine in what way credit shortages can influence the
evolution of an industry if technological improvement relies very much on credit and at the
same time echoes back to credit availability. In a model where firms decide how much they
want to invest in capital due to their market situation and how much on top they want to
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spend on research based on profit history it turns out that this hierarchy is sensitive to credit
shortages. Market conditions - such as credit availability and interest rates - are checked for
their impact on technological evolution and market concentration as well as total output.
There are two policies taken into account: the bank’s decision rules about creditworthiness
and the firms’ rule about adapting R&D effort. The approach is based on an evolutionary
model by Nelson and Winter. This heterogeneous agents based model is examined by using
a computer simulation.
The main findings are that the most crucial factor is overall credit supply available in the
industry. A higher credit supply is always beneficial to some extent but there is some critical
level of credit supply where the impact changes dramatically, i.e. there are jumps in the
dependent numbers. This is due to the fact that if there is sufficient credit supply at the
time a better technology is found there is also further credit supply in the longer run. The
interest rate has an intuitive effect in that a higher interest rate always hinders the evolution
of the firms and thus the industry which is simply due to the fact that interest is costly for
the firms.
The bank influences the evolution of the industry by its internal routines because it can
reinforce the positive effect of a new technology on the firm size via investment. The better
technology is visible for the bank later than for the firm that found it and therefore it matters
to what extent that technology is visible in the firm’s balance sheet two periods later. If the
bank considers predominantly firm size, it fosters further growth because firm size is directly
affected by better technology. Thus, the impact of the better technology is more significant
via firm size. If the bank looks predominantly on profitability, the impact of the better tech-
nology can be diluted. Therefore, the correlation between profitability and later firm size is
bigger if the bank values firm size relatively more. Also, smaller firms will improve more on
profitability than on size in comparison to large firms. Thus, if the bank values profitability
more, it gives an advantage to smaller firms. This however, reduces the probability of further
improvements compared to a situation where mainly large firms benefit from credit because
the probability of finding better technology is positively influenced by firm size.
Firms can adapt their R&D behaviour. This however, only influences their situation if there
is plenty of credit available. In that case a positive feedback rule is more effective on the
technological evolution but brings along a monopoly situation. This is due to the fact that
in a negative feedback scenario, innovators stop innovating and other firms try harder to
catch up. It is an inherent convergence behaviour. Nevertheless, the heftiness of reaction
promotes technological evolution in both scenarios because any desire can be met if there is
enough funding and profitability does not matter too much in such a situation.
This model considers only a single industry where a homogenous good is produced. Fur-
thermore, the bank is strictly backward-looking in its assessment of creditworthiness. There
might be further insights if different industries compete for funding where the bank again
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assesses the probability of bankruptcy for each firm. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
consider some exogenous policies, like the monetary policy of a central bank which would be
effective in the model as credit supply shocks. The trajectory of the industry in response to
those changes could provide insights about the effects of a particular policy on technology,
market power and individual access to credit.
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Appendix
Parameters and Variables
Control Parameters
interest rate i 0.05
average credit supply in unit of capital ls 0.027
bank’s weighing parameter for credit offer λ 0.3
firms’ R&D adjustment policy parameter λF 2
Parameters
Demand D 1,000
initial no. of firms 10
initial capital K0it 100
initial technology A0it 0.15
initial R&D spending desire Φ0it 0.004
minimum R&D spending desire bRD 0.002
innovative R&D success probability ainit 0.007
imitative R&D success probability ainit 0.02
depreciation rate δ 0.03
production costs c 0.16
lower capital barrier for bankruptcy crit 1
time horizon for looking back T 3
markup parameter for investment desire ϕ 3
Robustness Check
In order to check whether the results are robust, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is
conducted. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is performed because it allows for testing samples
where a normal distribution cannot be assumed and where the variance is unknown. It is a
non parametric test. The following procedure is as described by Sheskin.6 Basically, the test
is whether the medians of two sample populations (data sets) are likely to be the same at a
certain level of significance. If so, the two sample populations can be assumed to be drawn
from the same distribution. Some assumptions are essential for the test:
1. The observed data either constitute a random sample of N independent pairs of items.
6See Sheskin 2011, pp. 245 ff.
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2. The observed data are measured at a higher level than the ordinal scale.
3. The distribution of the population of difference scores between repeated measurements
of between matched items of individuals is approximately symmetric.
The Null-hypothesis is that the two populations which the results stem from do not differ in
their median ν : H0 : ν1 = ν2 while the alternative is for a two tailed test Halt : ν1 6= ν2. that
is, the median of population 2 is either below or above the median of population 1. The
results are checked for a significance level of 95%, that is α = 0.05. Each pair of data is
compared and the difference taken Wi = x1i− x2i for all i= 1, ...,N. Zero differences Wi = 0
are discarded and the sample size left is n. Since a two tailed test is conducted, the test
statistics is the minimum of the sums of negative and positive differences in the pairs of the
samples,
W :=Min[|W−|,W+].
If the sample size is sufficiently large,W can be assumed to be normally distributed. Then, a
z-value can be computed using the number of nonzero differences n. This can also be done
for the continuation of data in order to better compare the continuous normal distribution
with discrete data in the form
z=
∣∣∣W − n(n+1)4 ∣∣∣−0.5√
n(n+1)(2n+1)
24
.
In this test, the H0 hypothesis can be rejected if |z| ≥ zcrit where zcrit is the critical value at
a significance level chosen according to a table. For a significance level α = 0.05 the critical
value is zcrit = 1.645.
The intervals that the parameters for the test are chosen from are: The following tables
δ ∈ [0.025,0.035]
c ∈ [0.15,0.17]
aim ∈ [0.018,0.022]
ain ∈ [0.0065,0.0075]
bRD ∈ [0.0015,0.0025]
ϕ ∈ [2.5,3.5]
Table 1: Parameter space for the robustness check
depict the result of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for 100 random samples of above param-
eter space. If the Null Hypothesis cannot be rejected, ′′ns′′ is depicted. If it can be rejected,
then the direction of difference between sample medians is shown.
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λ = 0 vs. λ = 0.5
f irm rule credit supply AMax Her f indahl Out put
λF=0 Ls= 0.02 > > >
Ls= 0.03 > > >
Ls= 0.05 > ns ns
λF=1 Ls= 0.02 > > >
Ls= 0.03 ns > ns
Ls= 0.05 ns > ns
λF=2 Ls= 0.02 < > >
Ls= 0.03 ns > ns
Ls= 0.05 ns > ns
λ = 0.5 vs. λ = 1
f irm rule credit supply AMax Her f indahl Out put
λF=0 Ls= 0.02 < ns >
Ls= 0.03 ns ns ns
Ls= 0.05 ns ns ns
λF=1 Ls= 0.02 > > >
Ls= 0.03 > ns >
Ls= 0.05 ns ns ns
λF=2 Ls= 0.02 > > ns
Ls= 0.03 > > >
Ls= 0.05 ns < ns
λ = 0 vs. λ = 1
f irm rule credit supply AMax Her f indahl Out put
λF=0 Ls= 0.02 > > >
Ls= 0.03 > > >
Ls= 0.05 ns > ns
λF=1 Ls= 0.02 > > >
Ls= 0.03 > > >
Ls= 0.05 ns ns ns
λF=2 Ls= 0 > > >
Ls= 0.03 > > >
Ls= 0.05 ns ns ns
Table 2: Results of the Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank Test
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